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Will Jessup-Malik Talks Lead to Accord on Germany?

The crucial issue in the current American-Soviet conversations about Germany is the future status of the three zones occupied by the Western powers—the United States, Britain, and France. Since these powers, in March 1948, had decided to sponsor the establishment of a Western German state, the United States has been unwilling to admit Russia to a position of authority in administering that region. Russia, for its part, has repeatedly indicated that it wants to share the authority now exercised by the Western Allies in the western zones. The ability of Moscow and Washington to compose this difference will determine whether a new meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers would result in agreement.

Old Differences

In his address on April 28 to the American Newspaper Publishers' Association in New York, Secretary of State Dean Acheson suggested a compromise on this paramount issue. He would join the Western German state and the Eastern zone administered by Russia into a federation which would reserve extensive autonomy for the Western Germans over their own affairs. The effect would be a combination of German areas without the achievement of unity. Acheson's proposal revives the issue which caused the failure of conferences of the Council of Foreign Ministers in Moscow in the spring of 1947 and in London in the autumn of the same year, when former Secretary of State George Marshall recommended a federalized Germany under four-power supervision, while Vyacheslav Molotov, then Soviet

Foreign Minister, advocated a centralized government. The collapse of the 1947 efforts to find a basis for a German settlement led to the decision of the three Western powers to establish the Western German state. That decision in turn led to the imposition of the Russian blockade of Berlin. In other words, the four powers face in 1949 the same barriers to agreement that they found insuperable in 1947. The prospect for a settlement depends on whether their desire for agreement now outweighs the mistrust which in the past has caused them to disagree.

Administration officials in Washington want to believe that the Soviet Union has entered a period of conciliation which will enable Soviet officials to accept Western suggestions about Germany that they formerly rejected. President Truman and Secretary Acheson apparently interpret the Soviet proposal for a new meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers as a triumph for American foreign policy, particularly the North Atlantic pact, the Berlin airlift, and the progress made toward creation of the Western German state.

The American-Soviet conversations began shortly after the State Department on January 14 published for the first time a comprehensive argument for American participation in a North Atlantic pact system. At the end of January Premier Stalin told Kingsbury Smith of International News Service that he might consider lifting the blockade of Berlin in return for a lifting of the Western counterblockade of Eastern Germany. On February 15 Philip C. Jessup, American Ambassador-at-large, questioned Jacob Malik,

Soviet representative at the UN Security Council, about the Smith-Stalin exchange. That opening interview led to a series of conversations, climaxed on April 26 by the announcement from the State Department that the United States and the U.S.S.R. had been discussing the possibility of lifting the Berlin blockade and calling a meeting of the Foreign Ministers. Ambassador Jessup and Mr. Malik had not definitely agreed at that time that the convocation of the meeting would follow elimination of the blockade, but President Truman on April 28 said he believed the Russians were acting in good faith. He added that otherwise the United States would not continue the conversations. The possibility of a Foreign Ministers' meeting gave the President some hope that he could at last lay the solid foundation for peace which he has said on a number of occasions is his foreign policy goal.

Outcome Uncertain

Certainly the cold war has now entered on its most prolonged lull. Nevertheless, the prospects for a settlement that would permanently end East-West differences over Germany do not appear to be good. The State Department may be overestimating the effect of American foreign policy on Russia. One cannot yet assert with full confidence that the West has overpowered the Soviet Union diplomatically. The success of the Chinese Communist armies implies that Russia has not lost all possibilities for advancing its influence, even though Western Europe is at present closed to it. Is it possible that Moscow wants to ex-

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plore the chances of temporarily establishing stable relations with the Western powers concerning Germany so that it can focus its attention on Asia?

Whatever may be the motives of the Kremlin, the consequence of the announcement of the Jessup-Malik talks at this time has been to weaken momentarily American foreign policy to Russia's advantage. First, the disclosure has shaken the Western Germans' support for the Bonn constitution, on which Washington, London, and Paris intend to erect the trizone state. On April 25 Washington received word from Frankfurt that the major German parties at last were united in their approval of the constitution. The party leaders began to waver, however, when they learned a day later

about the American-Russian conversations. The Western state, to many Germans, signifies permanent partition of the Reich when most of them long for the re-establishment of a united nation. The present breakup of Germany can be traced mainly to the refusal of the Soviet Union and the reluctance of France to carry out provisions of the Potsdam Agreement of 1945 for the country's economic unification. Yet, today, as a result of the Bonn constitution, many Germans identify the United States with partition rather than Russia, to the detriment of American prestige.

Second, disclosure of American-Russian conversations weakens the strongest argument for the North Atlantic pact, which appeals to the Senate primarily as an instrument for protecting us from an ag-

gressive Russia. Hearings on the pact opened last week before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in a favorable Congressional atmosphere. If the Senate voted on the pact now, probably eighty members would approve it, and only sixty-four votes are needed. Yet many Senators favoring the pact are willing to postpone consideration of it until next winter, especially since a major foreign policy debate now would postpone consideration of important domestic matters like revision of the Taft-Hartley act and other proposed legislation on the President's "Fair Deal" list. Optimism respecting a general East-West settlement encourages this willingness to delay ratification and implementation of the North Atlantic pact.

BLAIR BOLLES

German Resurgence Feared by Poles and Czechs

Both Czechoslovakia and Poland are coping with political and economic problems, some of which are rooted in their long and uneasy history, while others are a direct result of war-engendered developments.

As early as 1943 the Czech government-in-exile, then in London, decided on the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans, and after liberation in 1945-46, ejected 2.4 million who today, as expellees, add to the difficulties of reorganizing the political life and economy of Western Germany where they took refuge. These expulsions, which reduced Czechoslovakia's population from approximately 15 million in 1939 to a little over 12 million today, have deprived the country of a considerable number of skilled workers, especially in certain export trades such as gloves, textiles, ceramics and glassware that had been centered in the Sudetenland.

Government spokesmen, however, contend that the resulting economic loss is preferable to the continued presence within Czechoslovakia's borders of a population many of whom, although by no means all, proved disloyal before 1939 to the nation in which they lived. It is also argued in Prague that the Sudetenland export enterprises, notably glove-making, were "sweated" trades which could compete on world markets only by maintaining low wage scales. In the long run, it is said, the Czechoslovak economy will be better off if it concentrates on the export of capital goods to newly developing countries like India and the nations of the Middle East rather than on nonessential

or luxury items for which there is at present little demand on the part of Czechoslovakia's prewar customers.

A Bi-National State

Prague also faces complex issues in establishing a workable balance between Czechs and Slovaks in what is in essence a bi-national state. The Czechs (over 8 million) are industrially advanced, and have had experience in the conduct of democratic political institutions. The Slovaks (about 3 million) are primarily agrarian and, in the opinion of foreign observers, decidedly susceptible to clerical Fascist ideas, as indicated by the establishment in 1939 under Nazi auspices of the puppet government headed by Mgr. Joseph Tiso. A determined effort is now being made to give the Slovaks as large a measure of participation as possible in the country's affairs under the new constitution of 1948 (some Czechs, in fact, feel that the constitution unduly favors the Slovaks) and to speed the industrialization of Slovakia through transfer to its territory of various enterprises, in some instances entire factories, from Bohemia and the Sudetenland. The predominantly rural and mountainous easternmost area of Czechoslovakia, known as Ruthenia or the Carpatho-Ukraine, with a population of 824,000, was ceded by President Benes to the U.S.S.R. in 1945. Because of its relative economic backwardness this area had been a drain on the Prague treasury during the interwar years; and Moscow sought it not because of its economic but because of its strategic value.

The Poles, too, have been struggling with a population problem—the transfer of 5 million Poles, most of them from eastern Poland acquired by the U.S.S.R. in 1945, to the areas of Germany taken over by Poland. These areas—called by Warsaw "Recovered Lands" because the Poles held some of them in the Middle Ages—comprise two-thirds of East Prussia in the north, and Silesia, Pomerania and a small part of Brandenburg in the west. Before 1939 they were inhabited by 8.5 million Germans and about 1 million Poles. Most of the Germans either fled as the Russians approached at the end of World War II, or were subsequently expelled by the Poles.

An Uneasy Border

If there is one point on which most Poles, including the Catholic Church in Poland, would agree, it is that Polish possession of these German territories is a closed issue. Every hint on the part of the United States, notably former Secretary of State Byrnes' Stuttgart speech of 1946, that the western border remains to be fixed under the peace treaty with Germany, merely hardens Poland's determination to resist the reopening of this question. The possibility is not excluded that the U.S.S.R., too, might at some point consider the return of at least part of Poland's German lands in order to win support in Germany. The Poles, however, believe the Kremlin would hesitate to take this step which, in their opinion, would result in the breakup of the Eastern European bloc. They are convinced, moreover, that Russia would not recon-

sider its own acquisition of eastern Poland. In Moscow's view, the new eastern border should end once and for all dreams of a "Greater Poland," at Russia's expense, which have been nurtured by many Polish leaders, most recently by Pilsudski in 1920. The Poles deeply regret the loss of eastern Poland, and especially of their historic city of Lwow, but they are inclined to accept the eastern border (drawn approximately along the line proposed by Lord Curzon in 1919) as final. The territory ceded to Russia is far less desirable from the economic point of view than the Recovered Lands, and before 1939 the Poles constituted the largest minority in the population of that area which numbered over 5 million Poles, over 4 million Ukrainians and over 1 million White Russians.

As a result of the postwar territorial changes, Poland today has a homogeneous population and, as one American expert points out, has "become in essence a national state, which it had not been since the fourteenth century."* It is estimated that at present there are some 40,000 Russian troops stationed in Poland along Russia's line of communication with its zone in Germany. Poles who oppose both Russia and communism would welcome any international development that would drive the Russians back within their borders; those who regard Germany as a greater evil than Russia and agree with Communist ideology consider the presence of Russian forces in Eastern Germany as a desirable safeguard against German irredentism.

In Warsaw one becomes acutely conscious of Poland's precarious position, poised as it is between two great and dynamic nations, the Germans and the Russians, and subject for two centuries to the interventions of both, with no natural obstacles to check invasion and dismemberment. Not that the Poles themselves have been entirely free of expansionist aspirations. But in the interwar years they maintained the existence of their reunited national state only by placating one or other of their powerful neighbors. Today, when Poland has cause to fear a new German irredentism spearheaded by German expellees, it sees little choice but to depend on the U.S.S.R., especially since it expects little sympathy from the United States which, as seen from Warsaw, was not enthusiastic about

Polish acquisition of German areas in the first place, and is now intent on rebuilding the economy of Germany. Only a settlement of the German problem that would allay Poland's fear of its western neighbor, coupled with a strengthened UN organization capable of defending small nations against great powers, might eventually reduce Warsaw's dependence on the U.S.S.R. and make it possible for the Poles to steer a course of their own in world affairs.

In very large measure this is true also of Czechoslovakia, although the Czechs, in contrast to the Poles, have an industrial base for the maintenance of a modern armed force. But when foreigners talk about the possibility of Czech military resistance to either Germany or Russia, they forget that, even when Prague in 1938 had, at its disposal forty divisions backed by the production of the Skoda works and other industrial enterprises, and was protected by the Carpathian Mountains, the Czechs did not put up a fight once they learned from what happened at Munich that they could not count on outside support against Hitler.

Political Cleavages

This does not mean that either Poles or Czechs, including Communists, are uniformly pro-Russian or irrevocably committed to an exclusively pro-Russian orientation. Both Poland and Czechoslovakia have historically had much closer ties with the West than was true of Russia before 1917. While the Czechs, who had not been subjected to Russian rule, had great admiration for "the spirit of Russia," to use the title of a well-known book by Thomas Masaryk; those Poles who, as a result of eighteenth-century partitions, had been ruled by the Tsars felt as hostile to the Russians before 1919 as their compatriots in German-administered areas felt to the Germans. Such feelings do not disappear overnight. Moreover, both in Czechoslovakia and Poland, Communist leaders, much as they might be in agreement with the Kremlin's basic views on communism, find themselves confronted in practice with distinctive national problems; and had hoped for greater latitude in settling those problems than, in the opinion of some, they are actually able to exercise.

In both countries the Communist party, although outwardly sharing authority with other parties of the Left in united fronts, exercises dominance through control of the government machinery, of trade

unions, and of other groups and organizations. Opposition elements have either gone into exile or are under close surveillance, with no opportunity to express their views. A good deal is heard about arrests and "labor camps," but foreign observers on the spot find it difficult to obtain exact information, and some warn against generalized comparisons of conditions in Poland and Czechoslovakia with those of Russia.

The power of the Communist leadership in both countries, however, is limited by disagreements in party ranks about the pace of economic development, and by the friendly interpersonal relations long in existence within such groups as trade unions—an element lacking in Russia at the time of the Bolshevik revolution. These factors tend to mitigate harsh directives from the top when it comes to their actual application to individuals.

In Poland Communist party disagreements were brought to the fore at the union congress of December 18, 1948, in Warsaw, where the Communist leader Wladyslaw Gomulka, who had done an able job as Minister for the Recovered Lands, was voted down when he opposed too rapid agricultural collectivization, and was dropped from the party's Political Bureau. More recently it has been reported that Hilary Minc, Minister of Industry and Commerce, regarded by both Poles and foreigners as the best technician in post-war Poland—many say in Eastern Europe—would also fall into disfavor because of his emphasis on the need to proceed more slowly with collectivization. For the time being, however, Minc appears to retain his strong position in the government, where he is one of the principal architects of the new six-year plan for industrialization and agrarian modernization. The possibility that Gomulka, probably the most popular figure in Poland, might become another Tito is discounted in Warsaw, principally because Poland's geographic position, unlike that of Yugoslavia, does not encourage comparable defiance.

The Communist party in Poland, however, is faced with two main problems, both of which involve deep-seated traditions and sentiments: how to enlist the support of the peasants, still a majority of the population, in the tasks of creating a balanced economy combining expanded industry with modernized agriculture; and how to work out new relations between the state and the Catholic Church.

VERA MICHELES DEAN

(The second of three articles on current developments in Czechoslovakia and Poland.)

*S. Harrison Thomson, "The New Poland," *Foreign Policy Reports*, December 1, 1947.

News in the Making

A declaration of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers conference in London April 28 cleared the way for the establishment of a *sovereign independent republic in India* without a break in India's ties with the Commonwealth. By a careful choice of words, India was given a unique position, affirming its acceptance of "the King . . . as the head of the Commonwealth," although the legal concept of the Crown is presumably to have no place in India's constitution. There remains the possibility that Pakistan, Ceylon and South Africa, depending on internal developments, may seek similar status in the future. . . . The *unification of India*, carried forward by the occupation and incorporation of Hyderabad last year under the spotlight of world publicity, has taken another step forward with the announcement on May 1 that the ancient monarchy of Baroda has been merged with the province of Bombay. . . . By contrast *Pakistan is proceeding more slowly* with the "assimilation" of ancient principalities such as Bahawalpur, Khairpur, Kalat and Kharan, or the rugged frontier states of Swat, Amb, Chitral, and Dir, whose native rulers are being invited to participate in the formation of a federal union. . . . Louis St. Laurent, first French Canadian Prime Minister since the turn of the century, who assumed office last August, dissolved Parliament on April 30 and set June 27 as the date for *new Canadian elections*. Successor to W. L. Mackenzie King as leader of the National Liberal party, his main opposition will come from the Progressive Conservative party led by George Drew, former Premier of Ontario. . . . Tentative settlement of differences between the Congress of Industrial Organization and the American Federation of Labor has paved the way for a meeting in Geneva in June or July to establish a *new world labor organization*. The proposed group will rival the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), under fire because of its Communist leadership. British union leaders believe that the Geneva meeting will bring 40 million members into the new organ-

ization. . . . Whether Latin American labor can remain fairly independent or is to be wholly government-controlled is the most critical issue before the *International Labor Organization's fourth conference of American states*, which opened on April 25 in Montevideo. A resolution has been secured calling on the ILO to investigate alleged violations of workers' rights on the part of the new army regimes of Peru and Venezuela. Neither of these countries is represented at the conference, but Argentina, whose labor policies provided them with a model, has sent a delegation of *peronista* workers. The Montevideo debates, moreover, show a rising concern among Latin Americans over Washington's failure—as they see it—to come to grips with such potentially explosive issues as the imbalance of international payments, trade and tariff controls, treatment of foreign capital, and the presence of reactionary governments in the inter-American community. . . . General Douglas MacArthur, speaking on the second anniversary of the adoption of Japan's constitution on May 2, promised the Japanese further *relaxation of occupation controls*. In keeping with this, the Diet recently passed a law for the protection of basic human rights, due to get cabinet approval soon.

Bridge or Barrier?

The strategic location of the Iberian peninsula is a paramount consideration in the review of Spanish policy which is currently taking place at Lake Success. As the cold war grew hotter in 1948, it became imperative to deny that body of land to any hostile power. But the peninsula is ruled by two dictators. How valuable an asset to the West are Franco Spain, Salazar Portugal? How much would an alliance with these countries cost us—in hard cash, and in loss of support within the Western democracies? Could we count on Franco and Salazar as allies? Or can we afford to ignore them? READ

SPAIN AND PORTUGAL—*A Dilemma for the West*

by Olive Holmes

May 1 issue

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Branch & Affiliate Meetings

*BOSTON, May 7, *Public Opinion and Foreign Policy*; DeWitt John, John H. Crider, John S. Hooper, Louis M. Lyons

*SPRINGFIELD, May 9, *Iron Curtain Problems*, Alexander St. Ivanyi

ALBANY, May 10, *British-American Relations*, Rt. Rev. G. Ashton Oldham

MILWAUKEE, May 10, *France Today*, J. J. Viala

BETHLEHEM, May 12, *American Security: Rio Pact, North Atlantic Pact and United Nations*, W. Leon Godshall

*Data taken from printed announcement

FPA Bookshelf

Leave It to the People, by Quentin Reynolds. New York, Random House, 1949. \$3.50

The breezy story, bright with anecdotes, of a well-known reporter's peregrinations in Europe and particularly in Palestine. It gives an enthusiastic picture of the "people's" belief in ultimate victory for democracy and of the emergence of a new nation in Israel.

Out of Exile, by Soetan Sjahrir. New York, John Day, 1949. \$3.00

In these letters to his Dutch wife written while in prison and internment from 1934 to the outbreak of the war in 1941, the former Premier and a leading spirit of the Indonesian Republic opens a revealing window into the mental processes of a cultivated man subjected to the humiliating experiences of colonial domination. At the same time, Sjahrir reveals the inner springs of the "nationalist" movements burgeoning throughout Asia.

As Others See Us, by André Visson. Garden City, New York, Doubleday, 1948. \$3.00

A perceptively written account of various misconceptions about America prevalent in different parts of Europe, with an explanation of some of the reasons for them, by a foreign-born American writer, editor and columnist.

The Rape of Poland: Pattern of Soviet Aggression, by Stanislaw Mikolajczyk. New York, Whittlesey House, 1948. \$4.00

The former Premier of Poland and leader of its Peasant party, has given a valuable firsthand account of the last ten years of Polish history, which covers the period of German occupation and later Soviet domination.

The Struggle Behind the Iron Curtain, by Ferenc Nagy. New York, Macmillan, 1948. \$6.00

The former Premier of Hungary gives an autobiographical treatment which throws further light on his country's struggle to resist the control of the U.S.S.R. and of Hungarian Communists.

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